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Reports on the Management and Disposition of Disused Sources

This page contains documents related to the management and licensing of radioactive sealed sources.  Sources for the documents include the DSWG, federal and state regulatory agencies, other government agencies, organizations, and interested parties.  These reports have been segregated based on the entity and subject matter.  Each of the headings below expand to provide the pertinent documents.

Disused Sources Working Group: The DSWG has produced a variety of reports to assist the sealed source community, both users and regulators

DSWG Report on the Management and Disposition of Sealed Sources

EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS FOR CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE LICENSEES

Generic Versions of Educational Materials

The following generic versions of the educational materials for current and prospective licensees are being made available free of charge for use by federal and state agencies, industry associations, brokers and processors, waste disposal operators, source manufacturers and distributors, and other interested stakeholders.  The materials may be edited and adjusted to accommodate the specific requirements of each individual user.  For the brochures, a fillable field has been included whereby individual user’s can insert their own logo and contact information.  For technical assistance, please contact DSWG Communications Consultant Cecilia Snyder at cecysnyder@gmail.com or at (202) 294-8253.

 

 

Disposition Options and Costs for Sealed Source and Devices

Licensing practices to encourage disposal of sealed sources

 

OTHER DSWG REPORTS AND MATERIALS

Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation

Potential Source Exchange Program for Reuse and Recycle of Disused Sources

 

Compact Import and Export Requirements

DSWG – CRCPD Survey of State Radiation Control Program Directors

FINANCIAL ASSURANCE

Correspondence to NRC re Financial Assurance

NRC Activities and Outreach re Financial Assurance

Stakeholder Comments re Financial Assurance

The following comments were submitted in response to the August 3, 2015 Federal Register notice from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking stakeholder input and perspective on plans to conduct a financial scoping study to determine if financial planning requirements for decommissioning and end-of-life management for some radioactive byproduct material are necessary:

Background re NRC’s Proposed Byproduct Material Financial Scoping Study

National Terrorism Advisory System

Control of Security-Related Unclassified Information

NRC Staff Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Security and Accountability

Stakeholder Comments re Category 3 Source Security and Accountability

The following comments were submitted in response to the January 9, 2017, Federal Register notice from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking stakeholder input and perspectives to inform the agency staff’s assessment of potential revisions to regulations or processes requiring Category 3 source security and accountability.

Wisconsin (RMP) Comments re Source Security and Accountability 3.9.17

Task Force on Radiation Source Protection and Security

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force to evaluate and provide recommendations relating to the security of radiation sources in the U.S. from potential terrorist threats, including acts of sabotage, theft, or use of a radiation source in a radiological dispersal device (RDD). The task force is comprised of independent experts from 14 Federal agencies and one State organization and is chaired by the NRC. The independent task force members represented agencies with broad authority over all aspects of radioactive source control, including regulatory, security, intelligence, and international activities.

Task Force Reports

 

The 2006 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report

The 2010 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report

The 2014 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report

The 2018 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report

The 2022 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report

 

NRC Implementation Plans

 

2006 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-06-0231

2006 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Attachment – SECY-06-0231

2007 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-07-0216

2007 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-07-0216

2008 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-08-0189

2008 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-08-0189

2009 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-09-0178

2009 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-09-0178

2010 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-10-0159

2010 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-10-0159

2011 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-11-0169

2011 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-11-0169

2012 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-12-0165

2012 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-12-0165

2015 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-15-0020

2015 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-15-0020

2017 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-17-0020

2017 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-17-0020

2019 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-19-0014

2019 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-19-0014

2021 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-21-0009

2021 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-21-0009

2023 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report – SECY-23-0011

2023 NRC Implementation Plan for the Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report Enclosure – SECY-23-0011

Government Accountability Office (GAO)

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent agency in the legislative branch of the federal government.  Commonly known as the “investigative arm of Congress” or the “congressional watchdog,” GAO exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people.  It provides Congress with timely information that is objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, nonideological, fair, and balanced. 

Over the years, GAO has evaluated the management and security of radioactive sealed sources.

Alternatives to the use of radioactive material

GAO-22-104113 Alternatives to Radioactive Materials – A National Strategy to Support Alternative Technologies May Reduce Risks of a Dirty Bomb – October 2021

 

GTCC disposal

GAO-22-105636 Nuclear Waste – DOE Needs to Improve Transparency in Planning for Disposal of Certain Low-Level Waste – September 29 2022

 

NRC licensing process testing (i.e. “sting operations”)

GAO-22-103441 – Preventing a Dirty Bomb – Vulnerabilities Persist in NRCs Controls for Purchases of High-Risk Radioactive Materials – July 2022

GAO-18-214 Nuclear Security – CBP Needs to Take Action to Ensure Imported Radiological Material is Properly Licensed – January 2018

GAO-16-330 Nuclear Security – NRC has Enhanced the Controls of Dangerous Radioactive Materials but Vulnerabilities Remain – July 2016

GAO-08-598 Nuclear Security – NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials – June 2008

GAO-07-1038T – Testimony – Nuclear Security – Actions Taken by NRC to Strengthen its Licensing Process for Sealed Rad Sources Are Not Effective – July 12 2007

 

Sealed source security

GAO-24-105998 High-Risk Radioactive Material – Opportunities Exist to Improve the Security of Sources No Longer in Use – Nov 2023

GAO-19-468 Combatting Nuclear Terrorism – NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radioactive Material – April 2019

GAO-14-681T Nuclear Nonproliferation – Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of US Industrial Radiological Sources – June 2014

GAO-14-293 Nuclear Nonproliferation – Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of US Industrial Radiological Sources – June 2014

GAO-12-925 Nuclear Nonproliferation – Additional Actions Needed to Improve Security of Radiological Sources at US Medical Facilities – September 2012

GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation – DOEs International Radiological Threat Reduction Program Need to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest Priority Radiological Sources – January 2

GAO-05-967 Nuclear Security – DOE Needs Better Information to Guide its Expanded Recovery of Sealed Radiological Source – September 2005

GAO-03-804 Nuclear Security – Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources – August 2003

GAO-03-638 Nuclear Nonproliferation – US and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening – May 2003

GAO-03-483 Nuclear Nonproliferation – DOE Action Needed to Ensure Continued Recovery of Unwanted Sealed Radioactive Sources April 2003

Transportation security

GAO-17-58 Radioactive Sources – Opportunities Exist for Federal Agencies to Strengthen Transportation Security – February 2017

GAO-06-545R Border Security – Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations – March 2006

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the world’s central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the nuclear field. It works for the safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, contributing to international peace and security and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.

Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Non-serial Publications , IAEA, Vienna (2004)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/6956/code-of-conduct-on-the-safety-and-security-of-radioactive-sources

Identification of Radioactive Sources and Devices, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 5, IAEA, Vienna (2007)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/7567/identification-of-radioactive-sources-and-devices

Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 11, IAEA, Vienna (2009)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/8113/security-of-radioactive-sources

National Strategy for Regaining Control over Orphan Sources and Improving Control over Vulnerable Sources, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-19, IAEA, Vienna (2011)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/8643/national-strategy-for-regaining-control-over-orphan-sources-and-improving-control-over-vulnerable-sources

Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, IAEA, Vienna (2012)  https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/8901_web.pdf

Control of Orphan Sources and Other Radioactive Material in the Metal Recycling and Production Industries, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-17, IAEA, Vienna (2012)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/8642/control-of-orphan-sources-and-other-radioactive-material-in-the-metal-recycling-and-production-industries

Sealed Radioactive Sources, IAEA, Vienna (2013)  https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/sealedradsources1013.pdf

Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NW-T-1.3, IAEA, Vienna (2014)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/10582/management-of-disused-sealed-radioactive-sources

Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, Non-serial Publications, IAEA, Vienna (2018)  https://www.iaea.org/publications/13380/guidance-on-the-management-of-disused-radioactive-sources

National Terrorism Advisory System

Control of Security-Related Unclassified Information

NRC Staff Re-Evaluation of Category 3 Source Security and Accountability

Stakeholder Comments re Category 3 Source Security and Accountability

The following comments were submitted in response to the January 9, 2017 Federal Register notice from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) seeking stakeholder input and perspectives to inform the agency staff’s assessment of potential revisions to regulations or processes requiring Category 3 source security and accountability.

 

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